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Abstract: 
Many motives for saving a portion of one’s income co-exist and their relative importance 
changes over the life-cycle. However, most existing work focuses on only one of those 
motives and makes simplifying assumptions about the other motives so that they can be 
relegated to the background. All the more it is important to investigate heterogeneity in 
saving behavior in the presence of various co-existing saving motives. This paper is 
concerned with linking heterogeneity in German households’ savings decisions to four co-
existing saving motives. First, I find that the importance that households attach to the 
saving motives is related to how much households save at different life stages. Second, I 
classify the saver type of the households based on whether they engage in regular savings 
plans, or rather save irregularly and without a savings plan and I find that saving motives 
are related to the saver type of the household. The results show that heterogeneity in 
saving behavior along two dimensions – with respect to the saving rate and the saver type 
– is systematically related to the importance that households attach to different saving 
motives. This suggests that policy reforms that change the importance of certain saving 
motives in the eyes of private households might alter household saving behavior in various 
ways.   
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1 Introduction 
For a typical household, many different considerations influence saving decisions over the life-
cycle. For example, households save to finance consumption after retirement. They save in order 
to insure against various economic, biometric, and political risks that they are exposed to over 
the life-cycle. Households might also engage in saving for supporting their children or 
grandchildren, e.g. during their education, or for leaving a bequest to them. Finally, many 
households are interested in saving for purchasing real estate at some point in their life. Many of 
these considerations and circumstances imply explicit saving targets and they require specific 
forms of saving, such as long-term and planned saving for retirement. 
Briefly, various saving motives co-exist over the life-cycle, and different motives might 
be associated with different forms of saving. Understanding what motives drive saving behavior 
over different stages of the life-cycle and how the relative contribution of these motives changes 
over the life-cycle will help us to understand differences in saving rates among households as 
well as past and future trends in saving behavior. As underlined by various authors (e.g., 
Bartzsch, 2006; Börsch-Supan and Lusardi, 2003), this understanding is of utmost policy 
relevance, since reforms of the social security systems directly interact with household saving as 
a private insurance. E.g., the currently ongoing reform of the German pension system is 
essentially concerned with the trade-off between public and private saving for old age: The 
reform moves the rather monolithical and very generous system that provides almost all 
retirement income within a single public pay-as-you-go-framework to a three-pillar system, in 
which private and occupational pensions will have an increasingly important role. Accordingly, 
the importance of private saving for old age has increased in recent years. Understanding the 
motives for private saving is also important from the perspective of taxation: For instance, the 
taxation of bequests and inheritances is non-distortionary if intergenerational transfers are 
accidental but may have efficiency costs if bequests are intentional (see, e.g., Bernheim, 2002). 
In summary, private saving is an important determinant of household economic security as well 
as social and economic well-being.  
 The point of departure of this paper – the observation that co-existing motives determine 
saving behavior – is an idea that goes back to Keynes (1936). While there is an extensive body 
of empirical literature on saving motives, which I review briefly in a later section, only few 
empirical studies take into account that different saving motives co-exist over the life-cycle; 
most studies focus on only one motive and make simplifying assumptions about the other 
motives such that those can be relegated to the background. A consistent finding in the literature 
is that there is considerable heterogeneity in household saving behavior, a point that is 
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emphasized by numerous authors, e.g., Alessie et al. (1997), Browning and Lusardi (1996), and 
Kurz (1985). In addition, many studies recognize explicitly that the contributions of saving 
motives to household saving might change over the life-cycle (e.g., Horioka and Wanatabe, 
1997; Kennickell and Lusardi, 2005). So far, however, there has been only little interest in the 
investigation of how co-existing saving motives whose contribution might change over stages of 
the life-cycle help to explain the observed heterogeneity in how much households save. This 
shortcoming is criticized by, e.g., Alessie and Lusardi (1997), Samwick (2006) and Wärneryd 
(1999, p. 264). Furthermore, extending the vast literature that seeks to explain how much 
households save, a recently emerging literature emphasizes heterogeneity in the extent to which 
households plan their saving or choose specific forms of saving, such as savings plans (e.g., 
Ameriks et al., 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006; Sourdin, 2005). While Ameriks et al. (2003) 
relate heterogeneity in the propensity to plan to the general household budgeting behavior as 
well to a household’s general attitudes and skills, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) and Sourdin 
(2005) focus on planning and old-age provision. Overall, recent findings, obtained from studies 
that mostly focus on one specific saving motive, suggest that the heterogeneity in household 
socio-economic characteristics, in household preferences, and in household saving motives is 
associated with heterogeneity in saving behavior with respect to two – not necessarily 
independent – dimensions, namely how much households save and whether they plan their 
saving. 
This paper focuses on the question to what extent heterogeneity in saving behavior can be 
explained by the importance that households attach to four potentially co-existing saving 
motives: The old-age provision motive, the precautionary motive, the bequest motive, and the 
motive to purchase a house (henceforth: housing motive). The paper finds that the importance 
attached to certain saving motives is related to heterogeneity in each of the two dimensions of 
saving behavior. More specifically, the paper first estimates the relationship between the saving 
motives and the saving rate. I find that information on saving motives is related to the household 
saving rate, and that the relative contribution of the saving motives to household saving changes 
over age classes. Second, the paper investigates whether saving motives help to explain what 
type of savers households are, e.g., whether they engage in regular savings plans, or rather save 
irregularly and without a savings plan. I find evidence for a relationship between the information 
on certain saving motives and the saver type of the households, i.e. the households’ propensity to 
plan their saving. 
To identify which of the saving motives are operative I use explicit data, i.e. answers to 
survey questions about the importance that households attach to the considered saving motives, 
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henceforth referred to as “subjective” measures.2 On the one hand, subjective measures can 
generally be criticized for being more prone to misreporting than other measures, for instance in 
the case when certain answers are socially desired. Furthermore, in the specific context of this 
paper the reported saving motives themselves can cause estimation bias since they are 
endogenous to the saving behavior of households. On the other hand, the subjective measures 
used in this study have considerable advantages: First, their cognitive burden is very low and the 
item nonresponse rate is negligible. Second, they provide an alternative way to measure the 
strength of the precautionary motive, which does not restrict attention to income risk only – a 
limitation in existing studies of precautionary saving that is criticized in the literature (e.g., Hurst 
et al., 2005).3 The subjective measure for the strength of the precautionary motive that is 
considered in this study includes other risks, such as health risks, longevity risk, and interest rate 
risk.4 Overall, the paper presents empirical evidence that the importance that households attach 
to various saving motives is associated with observed saving behavior. The findings suggest that 
policy reforms that change the importance of certain saving motives in the eyes of private 
households might indeed alter household saving behavior in various ways and with differential 
effects over households’ life stages. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides information on 
the data, describes how the principal variables used in this study are measured, and presents 
basic descriptive statistics. Section 3 provides an overview of studies on saving motives and 
saving behavior and relates the current paper and its empirical framework to the existing 
literature. In section 4, the empirical analysis of the relationship between information on saving 
motives, the saving rate, and household saver types is presented, and the findings are discussed. 
Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
2 Subjective data on saving motives have been used in existing studies. For example, information about bequest 
intentions has been used to learn about the existence of a bequest motive in studies by Alessie et al. (1999), Jürges 
(2001), and by Mirer (1979). Alessie and Kapteyn (2001) provide a detailed discussion about the usefulness of 
subjective data in research on saving behavior.  
3 The theory of precautionary saving predicts that households with higher income risk have higher accumulation, and 
most studies investigate the relationship between a measure for income risk and a stock or flow measure of saving 
without considering or controlling for other sources of risk. Palumbo (1999), and Kennickell and Lusardi (2005) are 
exceptions, they consider further sources of risk. 
4 Theoretical studies have shown the relevance of these risks for savings behavior, see, e.g., Yaari (1965) and Leung 
(1994) for uncertainty about lifetime. Palumbo (1999) presents a theoretical model that includes uncertainty about 
medical expenses – i.e., health risks – estimates its parameters based on data from the U.S. Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), and finds that uncertain medical expenses represent an important motive for precautionary saving. 
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2 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
2.1 The SAVE Survey 
2.1.1 Overview 
Departing from the Dutch CentER Panel and the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS) as an 
example, researchers of the University of Mannheim have cooperated with the Mannheim 
Center for Surveys, Methods and Analyses (ZUMA), TNS Infratest (Munich), Psychonomics 
(Cologne) and Sinus (Heidelberg) to produce a questionnaire on households' saving and asset 
choice. The SAVE dataset records detailed information on both, financial variables such as 
income, saving, and asset holdings as well as on sociological and psychological characteristics 
of households. Great care was taken that the interviewer talks to the member of the household 
who knows about income, wealth and saving behavior whom we henceforth refer to as the 
household head.  
2.1.2 The Random Sample 
A first wave of the SAVE study, which was based on quota sampling, was fielded in the 
summer of 2001. The findings from this study were used to investigate the impact of different 
survey modes on response behavior (see Essig and Winter, 2003). The next wave benefited from 
the methodological findings of the 2001 wave and was conducted in summer 2003. The 2003 
wave, which is used for the analysis presented in this paper, is a random sample of 2184 
households. 
The data universe for the SAVE 2003 random sample were all German speaking 
households in Germany with the households’ head being eighteen years and older. Interviewees 
were selected from a multiply stratified multistage random sample. Further sampling details are 
presented in Heien and Kortmann (2003). 
2.1.3 Data-Quality, Item Nonresponse, and Multiple Imputation 
Essig (2005) discusses various methodological aspects of the SAVE dataset, in particular the 
questionnaire, interviewer and interviewee motivation, and the representativeness of the survey. 
He compares the 2003 random sample and the German microcensus 2002 with respect to the 
joint distributions of age, household net income, and household size, and he concludes that the 
SAVE random sample “fits the German microcensus extremely well” (p. 12). He also confirms 
that various financial measures, such as income and financial wealth, are in line with findings 
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from a related German survey, the German Socio-Economic Panel 2003 (GSOEP).5 Finally, 
Essig concludes that unit and item nonresponse rates are very similar to related other surveys in 
Germany or other countries.  
Item nonresponse to sensitive questions about household financial circumstances is 
documented and discussed in Essig and Winter (2003) and in Schunk (2007). To prevent biased 
inference based on an analysis of only complete cases, an iterative multiple imputation 
procedure has been applied to the SAVE data (Schunk, 2007). Multiple imputation simulates the 
distribution of missing data and allows for a more realistic assessment of variances in 
subsequent analyses than single imputation. The procedure uses a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo 
method to replace missing data by draws from an estimate of the conditional distribution of the 
data. The multiple imputation algorithm generates five data sets with all missing values replaced 
by imputed values. For all descriptive statistics and all estimation results presented in this paper, 
the five imputed datasets are analyzed separately, and the results of the five analyses are then 
combined based on methods derived by Rubin (1987). The use of these methods assures that the 
missing data uncertainty is reflected in all findings presented in this paper. 
2.2 Basic Demographic Characteristics 
Table 1 shows basic demographic characteristics of the households in the 2003 random sample. 
Statistics concerning the age, marital status, number of children, education, and employment 
status of the household head are tabulated. Table 1 and all other statistics and estimations 
presented in this paper are not weighted. 
< Include table 1 about here > 
2.3 Measuring Household Saving Behavior 
2.3.1 Saving Motives 
The SAVE survey asks directly about saving motives. Households are asked how important 
they rate the considered saving motives in their own view. Each reason for saving has to be rated 
on a scale from 0 (“of absolutely no importance”) to 10 (“of highest importance”). To mitigate 
interpersonal differences in the response behavior to this question, a common approach is to 
classify the answers on a more coarse symmetric scale: All answers from 0 to 3 are in the lowest 
category (which I denote as “unimportant”), answers from 4 to 6 are in the middle category 
(“important”), and answers from 7 to 10 are in the highest category (“very important”).  
                                                 
5 The representativeness of the SAVE random sample has been further investigated by the author along other 
dimensions, results are obtainable upon request. All results underline the high representativeness of the SAVE random 
sample. 
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Table 2 shows the distribution of the answers across the four age classes that are 
considered in this study. Many households rate "saving as a precaution" and "saving for old age" 
as very important motives, whereas the bequest and the housing motive are overall of much less 
importance in all age classes.6 These findings are in line with findings in Alessie et al. (1999) 
which are based on an analysis of binary measured saving motives.  
< Include table 2 about here > 
2.3.2 Annual Saving 
After a number of questions that introduce to household finances and saving, respondents are 
directly asked for their saving in the previous year 2002 ("Can you tell me how much money you 
and your partner saved in total in the year 2002?"). Households that did not have any positive 
saving marked that they had zero saving or dipped into their saving; i.e., the answers are left-
censored at zero. Repayments of all recorded types of housing debt (excluding the interest paid) 
are then added in order to obtain a measure for active saving in 2002.7,8 This study is concerned 
with the relationship between saving motives and active saving decisions, therefore, any passive 
saving flows are not taken into account in the considered saving measure.9  
Figure 1 shows the mean and quartile saving rates for the 2003 cross section in each of the 
age classes that are considered in this study. The cross-sectional data exhibit two main features 
that are broadly in line with findings by Börsch-Supan et al. (2003) based on cross-sections of 
the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) in various years: First, the saving rate has a 
hump shape and, second, median saving rates are positive even for elderly respondents. The 
appendix gives further information on the distribution of wealth and income across age classes 
in the SAVE sample.  
< Include figure 1 about here > 
                                                 
6 In this paper, the measure for the bequest motive captures the intention to leave assets to heirs after death and the 
intention to transfer money to children or grandchildren inter vivos (see, e.g., Reil-Held, 2006).  
7 Household saving(s) can be measured and defined in different ways. For a discussion of micro data measures for 
household saving(s) and the corresponding statistical and methodological issues, see, e.g., Alessie et al. (1997), Börsch-
Supan et al. (1999), Brugiavini and Weber (2003), and Kennickell and McManus (1994). 
8 For 98 households I find that the repayments of housing debt are positive while the answer to the direct saving question 
is zero. For these households, I count the repayments of housing debt as total active saving of the household. The 
conclusions from this study do not change if these 98 households are excluded from the analysis. 
9 Note that in the SAVE questionnaire, the question about the importance of saving motives is asked in the context of a 
series of questions about active saving decisions; that is, the respondents are framed to think about active savings when 
they answer the questions about the importance of saving motives. 
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2.3.3 Saver Types 
SAVE elicits information on whether households save in a planned or regular manner, or 
whether households save irregularly and without a savings plan. The following question is 
asked: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Which sentence best describes the personal saving behavior of you and your partner? 
□ I/we save a fixed amount regularly, for instance in a savings plan, in a savings account, 
in shares or in a life insurance scheme.         [1] 
□ I/we put something aside each month, but I/we decide on the amount according to the 
 financial circumstances.             [2] 
□ I/we put something aside when I/we have something left over to save.     [3] 
□ I/we do not save because I/we do not have enough financial scope to do so.    [4] 
□ I/we do not save because I/we would prefer to enjoy life now.      [5] 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The questionnaire asks households explicitly to choose only the one behavioral pattern 
that characterizes best their behavior. Clearly, the fact that one of the categories has been chosen 
does not rule out that actual saving behavior is more complicated and consists of several 
patterns. Nevertheless, the answers to this question are informative concerning the predominant 
saving pattern of the household. According to the answers given to this question, I classify 
households into four different saver types: Households that plan their saving or engage in some 
sort of savings plan that is associated with fixed regular saving (category [1]); households that 
save regularly, but do not engage in a savings plan (category [2]); households that save 
irregularly (category [3]); and households that do not save (category [4] and [5] combined).  
Table 3 cross-tabulates the answers to this question with age classes and shows key 
financial statistics for each saver type. The table shows in particular that a very large proportion 
of households plans their saving and saves a fixed amount regularly. This proportion is 
significantly lower for households in the highest age class; further investigation reveals that 
there is also a significant difference between retired and non-retired households. Furthermore, 
table 3 shows that the average saving rate is highest for the group of households that engages in 
fixed regular saving, and decreases across saver types. 
< Include table 3 about here > 
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3 Saving Motives and Existing Literature 
This section discusses the existing literature in the context of the four considered saving motives 
and it relates the literature to the study presented in this paper.  
Classical life-cycle theory goes back to Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman 
(1957) and derives consumption and saving behavior from a well-defined intertemporal 
optimization problem that assumes rational and forward-looking agents who face a deterministic 
income path and smooth the utility of consumption over their life-cycle. Under standard 
assumptions about the utility function and combined with the fact that income is usually 
substantially lower after retirement than before, classical life-cycle theory thereby essentially 
captures an old-age provision motive. While the original intuition of the classical life-cycle 
model – that households save during their working years to accumulate assets which they use to 
sustain consumption after they retire – has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies over 
the years, there is also vast evidence that a large fraction of elderly households do not use up 
their wealth as predicted by the classical model; Mirer (1980) and Menchick and David (1983), 
for instance, are among the earliest of these studies. Alessie et al. (1999) show in a panel study 
that many elderly households even continue to accumulate wealth. 
The basic model has been extended to include specific saving motives. To present an 
extension that includes a precautionary saving motive, I follow the prominent example of 
Carroll (1992, 1997). Consider a household who faces a risky labor income path and maximizes 
the discounted value of future utility from consumption up to time T, his time of death: 
∑
==
T
t
t
t
C
CUE
T
tt 0}{
)]([max
0
β . (1) 
The household faces an intertemporal budget constraint: 
1
)(1 ++−=+ tYCXRX ttt . (2) 
And the household faces a borrowing constraint: 
         0≥− tt CX for all t. (3) 
Here,  tC is consumption,  tX is cash-on-hand at the beginning of the period,  tY is labor income 
which is assumed to follow a stochastic path,  tβ is the subjective discount rate, and  R is the 
constant gross interest rate. 
This model illustrates that, in the absence of complete insurance, expected shocks in 
disposable income lead prudent agents to save for smoothing the consumption path; i.e. under 
the given assumptions, savings do not only serve to finance consumption after retirement but 
also to insure households against income shocks. Simulations of (partially) calibrated versions 
(and various extensions) of the model predict that savings for precautionary motives can explain 
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a large share of total wealth accumulation (see, e.g., Caballero, 1991; Carroll, 1997; Gourinchas 
and Parker, 2002). Most of the empirical work on precautionary saving focuses on income risk 
as the origin for precautionary wealth accumulation and estimates the relationship between 
various measures for income risk and wealth accumulation. Evidence on the precautionary 
motive based on micro data yields mixed results and ranges from little or no evidence (e.g., 
Guiso et al., 1992; Skinner, 1988) to evidence for substantial precautionary accumulation (e.g., 
Bartzsch, 2006; Carroll and Samwick, 1998; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). In the context of 
this variety which might be due to numerous reasons such as country and measurement 
differences, two shortcomings of existing studies are being emphasized in the recent literature. 
First, Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) who find considerable precautionary savings in 
Germany based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), argue that the 
extreme differences observed in existing empirical studies of precautionary saving might stem 
from the fact that many empirical studies fail to control for self-selection into occupations, since 
they do not include measures for the risk attitude of the households. Second, it is argued that the 
total amount of saving for precautionary accumulation might have been underestimated because 
risks other than income risks are not considered in most studies (e.g., Hurst et al., 2005; 
Kennickell and Lusardi, 2005). The present empirical study intends to circumvent the former 
shortcoming by including a measure for risk attitude in the multivariate estimation framework; 
the latter shortcoming is approached by using a measure for the importance of the precautionary 
motive that does not restrict attention to income risk only.  
The basic version of the life-cycle hypothesis has also been extended to include a housing 
motive. Extensions that include a housing motive have been analyzed theoretically by Artle and 
Varaiya (1978) and by Hayashi et al. (1988). They find that in a world with downpayment 
constraints, the desire to purchase a house leads to additional saving for the purpose of financing 
home purchase. Emphasizing the role of downpayment constraints in the Italian housing market, 
Guiso et al. (1994) present evidence from micro data that the desire to finance housing purchase 
has an effect on the consumption profile of Italian households. Similarly, Moriizumi (2003) uses 
household data to investigate the presence of a housing motive in Japan and reports that wealth 
accumulation for housing purchase increases household saving and suppresses consumption for 
younger households. The degree of housing financial market imperfections in Italy and Japan 
might play an important role for the estimated effects in those studies, but it should be noted that 
German housing markets are also far from being perfect (Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003), suggesting 
that a housing motive might also have an effect on saving behavior in Germany. 
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Parents might not only care about themselves but also about the well-being of their 
children. Hurd (1987) extends the life-cycle hypothesis such that it includes a bequest motive. 
Again, the evidence on the presence and strength of an altruistic bequest motive is mixed (see, 
e.g., Jürges (2001) and Reil-Held (1999) for an overview and examinations of the bequest 
motive with the German SOEP data). The observed positive saving rates among many elderly – 
which contradict the simple form of life-cycle theory – do not prove the existence of an altruistic 
bequest motive. Bequests might also be purely selfish or they might be accidental (see Hurd 
(1990) and Kotlikoff (2001) for reviews of related literature), in which case they might stem 
from, e.g., uncertainty about the time of death (e.g., Davies, 1981), or from an unanticipated lack 
of capacity to consume (Börsch-Supan, 1992; Börsch-Supan and Stahl, 1991). Therefore, it is 
impossible to identify an operative bequest motive from saving rates or the shape of the wealth 
profile in the presence of co-existing saving motives that a study does not control for. Since the 
present study includes explicit measures for the saving motives, it identifies whether there is an 
overall contribution of an intentional (vs. an accidental) bequest motive; it is not possible to 
additionally identify the relative contributions of strategic vs. altruistic intentional bequests to 
total intentional bequests. 
While the above-mentioned studies are representative of the vast literature that focuses on 
only one specific saving motive and estimates the contribution of one motive versus the 
potential contributions of all other motives, only few studies have focused on co-existing 
motives. An early series of these studies was inspired by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) (and is 
reviewed in Kotlikoff (1988) and in Kessler and Masson (1989)) and has been explicitly 
interested in the relative contribution of co-existing motives to the stock of accumulated wealth. 
Three more recent empirical studies investigate the importance of various co-existing saving 
motives for the flow of household saving using micro data sets. First, Horioka and Wanatabe 
(1997) calculate the contribution of net saving to the flow of household saving for a large 
number of saving motives. They compute this contribution from direct questions about the 
hypothetical amount of current wealth that a household would hold for a specific motive, from 
questions about the household’s hypothetical wealth target for that motive, and from questions 
about the hypothetical number of years until the household’s planned realization date of that 
motive. Horioka and Watanabe find that the old-age provision motive, the precautionary motive 
and the housing motive are clearly the three most important motives in Japan. Second, in the 
context of a detailed analysis of wealth holdings, income and savings in Tthe Netherlands, 
Alessie et al. (1997) report descriptive statistics on a set of binary questions on whether certain 
saving motives exist at different stages of the life-cycle. They find that the precautionary motive 
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is the predominant motive over the life-cycle, a housing motive is indicated by many young 
households but only by few older households, saving for children is particularly important at 
older age, and the existence of an old-age provision motive is generally indicated by only very 
few households in The Netherlands. Third, Alessie et al. (1999) focus on saving after retirement 
and report descriptive statistics on subjective importance ratings of saving motives; they find 
that the precautionary motive is the most important motive among retired households.  
While these studies, dealing with co-existing saving motives, are based on descriptive 
statistics of survey questions concerning different saving motives, most studies that focus on one 
specific motive use multivariate reduced form models, in which the saving rate or accumulated 
household wealth is regressed on a number of socio-economic and financial household 
characteristics, and – if available – household preferences and expectations enter the equation 
additively (see, e.g., Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005; Kennickell and Lusardi, 2005). The 
present paper uses a classical reduced form, derived from a life-cycle model, and presents 
different specifications to show the sensitivity of the results with respect to the potential 
endogeneity of measures for household wealth. Generally, the selection of the included 
regressors is guided by extended versions of the classical life-cycle model that emphasize the 
role of households’ expectations about the future (see, e.g., Lusardi, 1999).  
4 Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis consists of three parts. In the first subsection, the relationship between 
saving motives and the saving rate is investigated based on different specifications of a 
semiparametrically estimated saving regression. The second subsection uses an almost identical 
multivariate specification but is concerned with the association between co-existing saving 
motives and the saver type of the household based on a multinomial model. The last subsection 
discusses the findings. 
4.1 Saving Rate and Saving Motives 
The estimation is based on the following specification: 
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Here, S is annual household saving as described in section 2.3.2., I is net household income, and 
W is household financial wealth or household total wealth, depending on the specification that is 
used for the analysis. Z is a vector of household characteristics: age, age², age³ of the household 
head, her/his gender, household size, the number of children of the household head or family, 
homeownership, educational status, and various job characteristics. The variable riskpref 
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captures self-assessed risk attitude of the household head. The inclusion of measures for 
expectations concerning the future has been motivated in a section above; equation (4) refers to 
the included controls, such as expectation about income uncertainty and about the future 
development of the German economic situation, as fut. Finally, motives stands for the measures 
for the four saving motives (see section 2.3.1). These four measures are interacted with dummies 
for the four age classes (< 35 years, 35-49 years, 50-64 years, ≥ 65 years) that are considered in 
this study. All included regressors are described in more detail in the appendix.10  
As is clear from section 2.3.2, the dependent variable in the saving regression is left-
censored at zero. A censored regression model is used to explain the saving rate y for all 
i = 1,..., N: 
)0,max(                     ,' ** iiiii yyXy =+= εβ  (5) 
Tobit estimates will generally be inconsistent if the error terms are heteroscedastic or non-
normal (e.g., Goldberger, 1983; Hurd, 1979). And for all specifications that I consider, the 
assumptions of homoscedasticity and normality of the error term are rejected in the present 
censored model at the 5% level based on the corresponding Lagrange Multiplier tests for 
censored models (Chesher and Irish, 1987). Therefore, I use Powell's (1984) semiparametric 
censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) estimator, which is consistent and asymptotically 
normal even if errors are heteroscedastic. In contrast to the assumption of homoscedastic and 
normal errors, which is imposed in the Tobit model, CLAD imposes the following conditional 
median restriction: 
0)|( =ii XMed ε  (6) 
The CLAD-estimator requires the minimization of a nondifferentiable function, 
Buchinsky’s (1994) iterative linear programming algorithm (ILPA) is used. The properties of 
CLAD with respect to the degree of censoring and the sample size have been investigated in 
various simulation studies (Deaton, 1999; McDonald and Xu, 1996; Paarsch, 1984). Both the 
degree of censoring and the sample size of the considered estimation in this paper, fall well 
beyond the limits that are specified in those studies and therefore strongly advocate the use of 
                                                 
10 To see that the findings concerning saving motives are meaningful, note also that in each single age class and for each 
considered saving motive, the importance ratings of the saving motives are non-degenerately distributed over the three 
importance rating categories (see table 2). As well, the saving rate has considerable and very similar variation in each 
age class. This is important in order to ensure that the effect of saving motives on the saving rate is identified. If, for 
example, all respondents in a certain age class would rate a certain saving motive as “very important”, the saving motive 
could be operative, although the estimation would not find a significant coefficient for the motive in the particular age 
class. Note further that the results presented in this study are robust to the choice of the symmetric scale in section 2.3.1.  
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the CLAD estimator rather than Tobit estimation. Standard errors for the CLAD estimates are 
computed using 150 bootstrap replications.  
The existing stock of wealth might be a substitute for, e.g., precautionary or retirement 
wealth accumulation, that is, it might be endogenous to the saving decision. To investigate the 
sensitivity to the inclusion of wealth, I use three different specifications: Specification (a) 
excludes the wealth variables, specification (b) includes financial wealth only, and specification 
(c) uses total net wealth of the household. The fact that all specifications yield similar results 
underlines the robustness of the findings. 
Table 4 presents the results of the CLAD estimation, and I report on results that are 
significant at the 10%-level in the text.11 
< Include table 4 about here > 
Each of the three age variables is significant in all specifications, and the three age 
variables are jointly significant in all specifications. The high school dummy which indicates 
whether the household head and/or her/his partner have senior high school education (the 
German “(Fach-)Abitur”), the dummy for civil servants, for unemployed household heads and 
for households that own their currently occupied house or apartment are all significant in the 
three specifications: Households in which at least one of the partners has high school education, 
have on average a saving rate which is about 3 percentage points higher than the saving rate of 
households for which this is not the case.12 Households with unemployed household heads have 
a saving rate, which is about 8 percentage points lower than households whose household head 
is working, and civil servants have a saving rate, which is about 3 percentage points higher on 
                                                 
11 Please refer to the tables for more detailed information on the significance levels. 
Two findings stand out in table 4: First, despite the inclusion of many explanatory variables, more than 90% of the 
variation in the saving rate remains unexplained. This is common in most studies of this type (see, e.g., Lusardi, 1999, p. 
103-109). Note that the value of R² even decreases further if I follow the common approach of transforming zero saving 
rates to a very small value and then log-transform the data for the savings rate. This suggests that the linear specification 
(4) in combination with the CLAD estimation which is robust to outliers (the presence of which is unavoidable in data of 
this type) should be preferred to the log-transformation in the present case. Second, while most reported coefficients do 
not vary much across specifications, specification (b) differs somewhat from specifications (a) and (c) – a finding that 
also shows up in the following section of this paper and that is due to the correlation between financial wealth and the 
dependent variable. 
Finally, note that I find very similar results if I follow a two-step procedure and restrict my sample to only those 
households with a nonnegative saving rate in the second step. As well, the inclusion of further variables, such as 
dummies for different regions (to account for differences in unemployment rate), for community size, as well as for 
household characteristics such as smoking habits does not change the results. 
12 All numerical examples that I use for illustrating the results of the CLAD-estimations refer to specification (a).  
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average. The coefficient of the home-ownership dummy is positive and significant, suggesting 
that households that own their occupied house or apartment have a saving rate that is about 8 
percentage points higher than the saving rate of households that are not homeowners.  
Turning to the main variables of interest, the saving motives, it is first found that despite 
the many included covariates, some of the interactions between saving motives and age classes 
still have significant predictive power. The coefficients of those interactions are a measure for 
the change in the saving rate in percentage points that is associated with a one unit increase in 
the importance rating of a certain saving motive for a certain age class. That is, on average, a 
household in the oldest age group that rates the precautionary saving motive as “very important” 
has a saving rate that is 2.4 percentage points higher than the saving rate of a household with 
identical covariates that rates the precautionary motive as “important”. Figure 2 shows the 
coefficients of the four saving motives by the age group of the household head for the three 
considered specifications. All figures show a similar pattern and illustrate how the association 
between saving motives and the saving rate varies over age groups. 
< Include figure 2 about here > 
The findings from this analysis are informative in two respects: First, concerning the 
subjective information on saving motives that is elicited in the SAVE study and, second, 
concerning the question which saving motives are operative at what life stage.  
Concerning the subjective information on saving motives, I find that while the descriptive 
statistics on the importance ratings of the single saving motives (see section 2.3.1) do not show a 
significant trend over all age classes (with the exception of the housing motive), the multivariate 
analysis does find that saving motives change significantly over age groups in their explanatory 
power for actual saving behavior. An explanation for the finding that trends over life stages vary 
between the pure descriptive statistics and the multivariate analysis is that households answer 
the subjective question about the importance of the saving motives by just stating their general 
importance rating of the saving motives.13 The multivariate analysis, however, estimates 
whether information on a single motive is indeed related to actual saving behavior at a certain 
life stage and under the assumption of co-existing saving motives. 
                                                 
13 I want to give two examples: First, almost every sixth childless household in the oldest age class rates the bequest 
motive as important or very important, although the corresponding question explicitly talks about children or 
grandchildren as the recipients. Second, Table 2 reveals that almost 30% of the households in the oldest age class think 
that the housing motive is an important or very important saving motive; however, the age, the financial resources, and 
the answer to a specific question about the savings goal suggest clearly that almost all of these households will most 
likely not purchase a house in the future. 
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Concerning the question which motive is operative at what life stage, table 4 shows that 
the old-age provision motive and the housing motive are both significantly related to the saving 
rate in early life stages. While the presence of a housing motive in the youngest age class of 
German households is of interest for itself, the finding that there is a particularly strong effect of 
the old-age motive for the youngest age class deserves some more explanation as it might be 
connected to the increased public debate about the German pension system which started in the 
late 1990s and which was associated with marketing and information campaigns by insurance 
and bank companies. These campaigns have especially targeted younger households, which will 
be affected stronger by the reforms than older cohorts. Börsch-Supan et al. (2004) provide 
evidence for a recent increase in the awareness about the fact that one effect of the pension 
reform will be a decrease in pension levels, and young households are particularly aware of 
these facts.14  
Table 4 further reveals that in contrast to the old-age provision motive and the housing motive, 
the bequest motive and the precautionary motive are particularly operative for older age groups. 
Both findings are comparable with existing studies that focus on only one specific saving 
motive. First, in his study that focuses exclusively on the bequest motive, Jürges (2001) also 
finds an operative bequest motive among the elderly. He reports consistently and significantly 
different wealth trajectories for elderly households that declare that they have a bequest motive 
compared to households that declare not to have a bequest motive. Second, the effect of the 
precautionary motive is in line with findings on precautionary wealth accumulation by 
Kazarosian (1997) and Lusardi (1998, 2000), who investigate older workers, as well as by 
Carroll and Samwick (1998) and by Kennickell and Lusardi (2005). An explanation for the 
increase in the precautionary motive with age are the increased health risks that older people 
face, i.e. risks associated with considerable health costs. Indeed, even controlling for many 
household characteristics, I find that – with increasing age – expectations concerning the 
                                                 
14 Furthermore, the great majority of household heads in the SAVE sample are dependent employees (see table 1), for 
whom participation in the German pay-as-you-go system is mandatory, and for many of whom private old-age 
provision has only recently become an important issue, given that a large proportion had completely relied on publicly 
funded old-age provision provided by the traditionally fairly generous German pension system. The German retirement 
insurance system has a high replacement rate, generating net retirement incomes that have been about 70 percent of pre-
retirement net earnings for a dependent employee with a 45-year earnings history and average life-time earnings in the 
late 1990s. Overall, public pensions constitute more than 80 percent of the income of households headed by persons 
aged 65 and older, while funded retirement income, such as asset income or firm pensions, plays a much smaller role 
than, e.g., in the Netherlands or the Anglo-Saxon countries (Börsch-Supan et al., 2003). 
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development of the health situation get worse, whereas expectations about the future economic 
situation are not significantly related to the age of the household, and subjective expectations 
about future earnings variance decrease with an increase in age (see appendix, section 6.3.1). 
Additionally, an analysis based on six waves of the official budget and expenditure survey 
(Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, conducted every five years by the German Federal 
Statistical Office), reveals that out-of-pocket medical expenditures are increasing significantly 
with age, they are about four times as high at the age of 80 than at the age of 50 (see appendix, 
section 6.3.2, and figure A.1). 
4.2 Saver Types and Saving Motives 
The previous section shows that information on saving motives helps to explain how much 
households save. Do saving motives also help to explain how households save, i.e. whether they 
engage in regular savings plans, or rather save irregularly and without a savings plan? The goal 
of this section is to relate heterogeneity in the degree of planning and regularity of saving 
behavior to households’ saving motives in a multivariate framework that includes the saving 
motives as in the previous section. The results are informative as to whether certain motives for 
saving are crucial in determining the saver type of a household. 
Authors that are concerned with heterogeneity in the extent to which households plan their 
saving (e.g., Lusardi, 1999; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006; Venti, 2006) underline that numerous 
behavioral and psychological factors interfere with the ability to compute optimal plans or to 
simply make a plan and execute it.  
In contrast, conventional life-cycle theory assumes that households are able to formulate 
savings plans based on expectations about the future, but the theory neither models 
psychological factors that are relevant in this respect, nor does it take a stand on the regularity 
and contractual form of household saving and its relationship to saving motives. However, given 
certain income paths, life-cycle theory has some implications: For example, consider a 
household with an extremely volatile income path that regularly drops below the expenditure 
and consumption path and with only a small stock of financial and liquid wealth. This household 
might well have precautionary savings, which have been accumulated in periods with higher 
income and which are needed to finance consumption in unforeseen low income periods (see, 
e.g., Carroll and Samwick (1998), who provide simulations based on the buffer stock model). 
But in the presence of borrowing constraints, intertemporal consumption smoothing implies that 
this household would not engage in regular or in contractual saving: The household would not 
be a regular saver because of the dramatic income shocks that occur from time to time, and the 
household would not engage in contractual saving since the money should not be bound 
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contractually, in order to be able to finance consumption in unexpected low-income periods. In 
turn, high-income civil servants15, for instance, would probably save very regularly to provide 
for unforeseen events for which liquid wealth is needed or to provide for old age. Given the 
attractiveness of certain savings contracts, in particular considering existing state subsidies for 
certain long-term savings plans, it might also be rational for high-income civil servants to 
engage in contractual saving. I mention these examples above because they first illustrate that 
while the life-cycle model is informative concerning the saver type for specific income paths, it 
is generally rather silent about the relationship between the form of saving and saving motives. 
And second, they underline that any study that is concerned with the identification of the 
relationship between saving motives and household saver types should include proxies for the 
income uncertainty of the household; the present study includes dummies for the type of 
employment and a subjective measure for future earnings variance. 
I investigate the relationship between saver type and saving motives using discrete choice 
models. The same explanatory variables as in the analysis in section 4.1 enter the estimation. 
The only difference is that the saving motives are not interacted with age classes, since there is 
no a-priori hypothesis that the effect of saving motives on the saver type should vary by age 
class. Furthermore, the sample for this analysis is restricted to the non-retired population, since 
life-cycle theory predicts that retired households dissave.16  
< Include table 5 about here > 
The relationship between the saver type classification and saving motives is first 
investigated using a multinomial logit model for three alternatives.17 Table 5 presents estimation 
results using the type “irregular saver” (category [3]) as the base category. For reasons stated 
                                                 
15 In Germany, civil servants can expect a non-declining income path until retirement. A civil servant can only be 
transfered to a new position if her wage does not decline due to the transfer. Furthermore, a civil servant can only be 
dismissed is she is sentenced to a certain period in prison for any criminal charge or for charges associated with treason.  
16In particular, there should not be an old-age provision motive any more for retired households, i.e. those 
households do not save for an income drop due to retirement. In fact, the data show, first, a sudden decrease in the 
saving rate after retirement and a significant increase in left-censored observations with the corresponding saving rate 
being less or equal to zero.  
Second, there is a highly significant difference in the distribution of households across saver types between the retired 
and the non-retired sample, and only mild and mostly insignificant differences in the distribution between different 
age classes of the non-retired sample. And, third, the analysis presented above shows that the old-age provision 
motive has no significant predictive power for households in the highest age class. 
17 In multinomial logit models, the odds ratio between any two choices does not depend on the other choices, this 
property is termed the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). A Hausman-McFadden test (Hausman and 
McFadden, 1984) suggests that for all specifications that I consider, the IIA assumption cannot be rejected.  
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above, I present again the three different specifications that have been used in the previous 
section. 
Table 5 reveals that the estimated coefficients and standard errors do not differ very much 
across specifications; therefore, the following interpretation of the results does not distinguish 
between specifications. Focusing on the type of households that plan their saving and engage in 
a regular savings plan (type 1), it is first found that civil servants are significantly more likely to 
be of this type, and unemployed households are significantly less likely to be of this type relative 
to the base category, type 3. While the bequest and the housing motive are not significantly 
related to the relative probability ratios, an increase in the subjective importance rating of the 
precautionary motive is associated with a significant decrease in the probability of being of this 
saver type (type 1) relative to being an irregular saver (type 3). More specifically: Relative to the 
base alternative, an increase of the precautionary motive from “unimportant” to “important” is 
associated with a 26% smaller probability of being in the group of households that plan their 
saving and engage in some sort of regular savings plan. Conversely, an increase in the 
importance rating of the old-age provision motive comes along with an increase in the relative 
probability of being in this group. The model estimates a 120% higher probability relative to the 
base alternative if the old-age provision motive is increased by one unit. For the group of regular 
savers that do not engage in fixed saving (saver type 2), no significant relationship at the 10% 
level is found except from the result that an increase in the importance of the old-age provision 
motive is positively associated with the probability of being a regular saver relative to the base 
alternative.  
An important underlying assumption of the multinomial logit estimation is the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) which implies a certain substitution pattern across 
alternatives. If substitution actually occurs in this way and if the model is specified correctly, 
then the multinomial logit model is appropriate. While the IIA property that gives rise to the 
proportional substitution pattern of the multinomial logit model was not rejected in the present 
case by a Hausman-McFadden test (see footnote 17), it has been noted that this test has low 
power under many circumstances (see, e.g., McFadden, 1987). Therefore, I have also estimated 
a multinomial probit model that relaxes the IIA assumption by allowing for correlation across 
choices in the unobserved components. The findings from the multinomial probit model are in 
line with the conclusions presented above, and they are detailed in the appendix, section 6.4. 
Finally, I have also investigated the relationship between saver type and saving motives based 
on binary logit models for all three specifications.18 In the binary choice models the probability 
                                                 
18 The results can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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of being of a certain saver type is compared to the probability of being in any of the other 
groups. Again, the findings support all conclusions from the multinomial choice analysis.  
The analyses in this section present descriptive evidence that there is a relationship 
between importance ratings of saving motives and the household saver type. First, I found that 
an increase in the importance attached to precautionary reasons for saving is associated with a 
decrease in the probability of being of saver type 1 relative to saver type 3, and to a decrease of 
the probability of being of saver type 1 relative to type 2. An explanation is that households with 
a strong precautionary motive are aware that they might need their savings at some particular but 
unknown point in time, and therefore they decide that their savings should not be bound in a 
savings plan or in shares by that unknown point in time.  
Second, I find that an increase in the importance of the old-age provision motive is 
associated with a significantly higher probability of engaging in regular and planned saving. 
This finding might have several explanations. One explanation is that households that want to 
save for retirement react to the incentives of banks and insurance companies as well as to 
subsidies by the government and use the more attractive longer-term savings plans in order to 
save for long-term saving goals. This can be confirmed by looking at what specific financial 
products German households use for their savings. A recent study by Reil-Held and Schunk 
(2006) reveals that – controlling for co-existing saving motives – there is indeed a strong 
association between the importance attached to an old-age provision motive and the probability 
of buying state-promoted and long-term savings plans, such as a so-called Riester-pension, life-
insurance schemes, or other private pension schemes. A further plausible explanation is that 
households indicating a high importance of old-age provision exercise self-commitment: 
Savings that are planned for retirement should remain untouched during work-life and are 
therefore made in the form of fixed contractual savings.  
Through allowing for the co-existence of various saving motives, the presented results 
concerning the old-age provision motive add well to existing findings about saving behavior and 
future planning. First, combined with the descriptive result in table 3 that households that save 
regularly and in a savings plan also have a higher saving rate on average, the findings are in line 
with the above-mentioned findings by Lusardi (1999) concerning a relationship between 
retirement planning and wealth accumulation. Second, they complement findings by Ameriks et 
al. (2003), who report direct evidence that households with a high propensity to plan their long-
term future save more, are better able to exercise self-control, and self-commit to a certain 
behavior.  
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4.3 Discussion 
The presented estimations include an extensive set of variables. This shows that the measures for 
saving motives correlate with saving behavior even after controlling for the rich information 
about households available in the SAVE survey. The fact that three different specifications lead 
to similar results further underlines the robustness of the results. Of course, the direction of the 
causality as well as the presence of third factors is debatable in the given context; the presented 
methodology does not address the question of causation, and any causal interpretation of the 
results would depend on the underlying model and its underlying assumptions.19 In the given 
context, accumulated wealth itself could have an effect on the importance that households attach 
to certain saving motives. Additionally, it is important to note that the cross-sectional data that 
are used for this study do not allow to control for cohort effects. The cross-sectional data neither 
permit the estimation of structural models that account for endogeneity and dynamics. But since 
the dependent variable in the analysis of saver types characterizes a stable behavioral rule rather 
than one single observed saving decision, the analysis of saver types is not sensitive to dynamic 
shocks that might have an impact on the findings.  
A limitation of this study is that through providing two independent analyses, I implicitly 
make the behavioral assumption that households face two independent decisions: They decide 
how much they save, and they decide whether to engage in savings plans, save regularly, or 
rather save irregularly. These two decisions are not necessarily independent as table indicates. 
Another model would be that households decide first about how much they save and then – 
conditional on the amount that they want to save – they decide about how regular they save or 
whether they engage in a savings plan. It is not clear which is the correct model for the decision-
making process in this case. Further multinomial choice analyses of the saver type in which I 
include the saving rate as an additional covariate, reveal that the saving rate is significantly and 
positively associated with the relative probability of being a regular saver (type 2) and a saver 
who engages in savings plans (type 1); however, the coefficients of the saving motives are not 
affected by the inclusion of the saving rate, indicating that all established relationships still hold.  
Finally, the measures for the saving motives themselves could be related to other included 
variables – such as risk preferences or future expectations – or to unobserved factors that are 
relevant for decision-making but that the study does not control for, e.g. psychological traits of 
the respondent. Given that there is no testable structural theory that relates the psychological 
                                                 
19 The most important example is the basic assumption that people are forward-looking: If people were not forward-
looking, the saving motives would not play any role for explaining their savings behavior, people would simply save 
what is left over after consumption, without having any specific saving motive in mind.  
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traits measured in SAVE to saving motives and saving decisions and that would guide a further 
analysis of their relationship to savings behavior, I simply included those psychometric variables 
additively in the regressions, in order to learn about the potential impact of those factors on the 
presented regressions. As an example, consider that optimism rather than classical preference 
measures may be linked to major economic decisions, as is claimed by various scholars (Gervais 
and Goldstein, 2004; Rigotti et al., 2004; Puri and Robinson, 2005). Following this idea, a self-
reported measure for optimism has been included in the analysis. While this measure correlates 
with most elicited measures for future expectations, the inclusion of this measure into the 
analyses does not have a considerable effect on the coefficient estimates for the saving motives, 
i.e., it does not alter the conclusions from this paper. In the SAVE survey, the household head is 
also asked to provide a self-assessment concerning her happiness, her self-assuredness, and she 
is asked to what degree she considers herself a creature of habit or a person that is open to 
change.20 The inclusion of all these subjective measures in the analyses does not have an impact 
on the conclusions of this paper. As well, SAVE elicits alternative measures for risk preferences 
than the one considered in the presented analysis;21 after including these alternative risk 
measures, still the same relationship between saving motives and saving decisions is found. 
These findings underline the robustness of all results. 
 
Overall, the results – established in a framework that controls for the co-existence of different 
saving motives – show that the subjective assessment of the importance of saving motives is 
significantly related to two dimensions of household saving behavior. If these relationships are 
insensitive to a wide range of policy changes and to changes in micro- and macro-economic 
circumstances, then targeted information campaigns or policy reforms that substantially change 
the importance of certain saving motives in the eyes of private households might indeed have 
various effects on the saving behavior of those households. These findings are of particular 
interest in the context of current policy reforms in Germany, which directly interact with private 
household saving, and therefore require an understanding of whether and how households react 
to the desired reforms and the associated information campaigns. Particularly helpful for policy 
would be the question whether the relative saving contributions of different motives compete 
                                                 
20 For all these above-mentioned measures (i.e., optimism, self-assuredness, etc.), respondents are asked on a scale from 
0 to 10 whether a statement of the form “I am optimistic”, “I am a self-assured person”, etc. “does not apply at all” (0), 
or “applies very well” (10). 
21 More specifically, respondents are asked about their willingness to take risks with respect to their health, their career, 
leisure time and sports, and car driving on a scale from 0 to 10. 
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with each other. Given that in all life stages most households are constraint in their budget (as an 
additional analysis of overdrafts reveals), the present analyses suggest that a different set of 
motives competes at different life stages. Reil-Held and Schunk (2006) investigate specific 
forms of saving and report additional evidence for competing saving motives: In a multivariate 
framework that includes the same socioeconomic controls as in this study, they find that for 
young households an increase in the importance of the home purchase motive is associated with 
a strong decrease in the likelihood of taking part in state-promoted old-age savings plans; this is 
in line with the presented findings about saving motives for younger households, given that most 
households are constraint in their budget. From a policy perspective it is of interest to understand 
the precise nature of this competition better. How does the nature of this competition change 
over the life-cycle? The present study illustrates that indeed many motives whose relative 
contribution changes over age classes are simultaneously associated with saving decisions and 
must be taken into account when discussing the effect of policy reforms on household behavior.  
5 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated household saving behavior based on a random sample of German 
households that have been surveyed specifically to learn about their saving decisions. The data 
contain rich information on household financial, socio-demographic, and psychological 
characteristics and they offer the opportunity to investigate saving behavior under the 
assumption of co-existence of various saving motives which are elicited based on subjective 
importance ratings. 
The results of this study support the view that households’ saving decisions are influenced 
by different saving motives that co-exist over age classes, but whose relative contribution to 
household saving changes with age. Households’ reported importance of various saving motives 
is related to heterogeneity in saving behavior with respect to two dimensions: First, it is related 
to heterogeneity in the household saving rate at different life stages. The effects of various 
saving motives are generally appropriate given the different stages of the households’ life-cycle. 
In particular, further investigations, e.g. based on official survey data, reveal that the increase of 
the importance of the precautionary motive with age – which is in contrast with most existing 
literature that derives a precautionary motive only from income variance – is plausible, given the 
development of households’ expectations and medical out-of-pocket expenditures with age. 
Second, both the old-age provision motive and the precautionary motive are related to 
heterogeneity in the saver type, i.e. related to a classification of the regularity of household 
saving. The latter findings suggest that for many households the decision whether to save in a 
savings plan is related to the purpose of their saving. For instance, households indicating a high 
 24
importance of old-age provision have a high probability of saving regularly and in savings plans. 
At the same time, these relationships can be driven by a wish to exercise self-control on the part 
of those households that are concerned about their retirement saving. How this relationship 
works precisely, how psychological determinants and institutional incentives influence the 
process of wealth accumulation and how the process of wealth accumulation itself might feed 
back onto the relevant psychological determinants of saving behavior are very interesting and 
important questions for further research.  
The finding of a relationship between the importance that households attach to different 
saving motives and their actual behavior suggests that policy reforms that substantially change 
the importance of certain saving motives in the eyes of private households might indeed alter 
household saving behavior in different ways and with differential effects over the life stages. 
That is, information and motivation are crucial for the successful implementation of policies. 
While this seems a trivial insight, the last German pension reform has demonstrated how the 
German government has neglected necessary information and motivation campaigns, such that 
banks and insurance companies took over and controlled the dynamics of the process (Reil-Held 
and Schunk, 2006). The present study has also argued that different saving motives are 
“competing” for their relative contribution to household saving: Experiences with the German 
pension reform show that an increase in saving for old age might not be associated with an 
increase in the overall amount of household savings, but rather with a substitution between 
different forms of saving. That is, the increase in the importance of a certain motive is likely to 
come at the expense of the savings flow to a particular other motive. Extensions of this study 
should investigate the relationship between saving motives – as can be captured in recent 
behavioral life-cycle models of saving behavior (see, e.g. Binswanger, 2006a, 2006b) – and the 
flow of household saving to various specific financial assets – such as pension plans, building 
society contracts etc. – in order to estimate how changes in the importance attached to different 
motives are reflected in portfolio choice behavior. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Wealth and Income 
< Include table A.1 here > 
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6.2 Covariates 
< Include table A.2 here > 
 
Additionally, subjective importance ratings of the four saving motives are included as 
covariates. In the CLAD-estimation, these measures are interacted with dummies for the four 
age classes that are considered in this study. In the regression output, “1” stands for the lowest 
age class (<35), “2” refers for the age class 35-49, “3” indicates age class 50-64, and the oldest 
age class is denoted by “4”. That is, “mot_oldage1” refers to the old-age provision motive in the 
lowest age class. In total, 4 · 4 = 16 interacted variables for the saving motives are included in 
the regressions. 
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6.3 Future Expectations and Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures 
6.3.1 Development of Future Expectations with Age 
< Include table A.3 here > 
 
Note: This table presents a regression of subjective expectations concerning the health situation, 
concerning the German economic situation and concerning the variance of future earnings on 
household characteristics. The table shows in particular that an increase in age is associated 
with significantly worse expectations concerning the development of the health situation. The 
findings from this regression – a strong negative effect of the age-variable on the expectation 
concerning the development of future health, no significant effect of the age-variable for the 
expectations concerning the development of the German economic situation, and a positive but 
insignificant effect for expectations concerning earnings variance – remain the same if I include 
higher order terms of the age variable (age² and age³) and test for joint significance. 
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6.3.2 Development of Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures at Old Age 
Figure A.1 shows median annual out-of-pocket medical expenditures for different cohorts, 
calculated from six waves (1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003) of the official German Income 
and Expenditure Survey (EVS), collected by the Federal Statistical Office. All values are in 
2001 Euros, they are converted based on CPI-data from the Federal Statistical Office. The oldest 
cohort is born in 1906, and they enter the picture at the age of 72 in the 1978 wave of the survey. 
The youngest cohort is born in 1951, they are 52 years old at the time of 2003 wave of the EVS. 
We see more than a fourfold increase in out-of-pocket medical expenditures in the age range 
that we observe. 
 
 
< Include figure A.1 here > 
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6.4 Multinomial Probit Model for Saver Types 
The multinomial probit model allows to relax the assumption of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives by estimating the variance-covariance parameters of the latent-variable errors, 
instead of imposing that errors are independently and identically distributed according to a type 
1 extreme value distribution. I have not motivated the multinomial choice analysis in section 4.2 
based on an additive random utility choice framework, since I consider the underlying 
econometric model less as a behavioral model of choice in this context but rather as a descriptive 
analysis of the statistical association between saver types and saving motives. In this line, the 
purpose of the multinomial probit analysis presented in the appendix is not to claim that a 
different behavioral structure describes this association better, but only to show that even if I 
relax the IIA assumption by allowing for correlation between the latent-variable errors, the 
conclusions from this paper still hold. The multinomial probit model assumes that the stochastic 
error terms have a multivariate normal distribution. As described by Train (2003), the model 
requires normalization since both the location and scale of the latent variable are irrelevant. To 
normalize location, I choose – as in the multinomial logit model – saver type 3 (irregular savers) 
as the base alternative. To normalize for scale, I fix the diagonal elements to 1. While this still 
imposes some structure on the covariance matrix that is necessary for identification since the 
model does not include alternative specific variables, it still allows for correlation between the 
error terms of saver type 1 and saver type 2, which the multinomial logit model does not do. 
The results (see table A.4), which are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood, 
confirm the role of the precautionary and the old-age provision motive that is discussed in the 
paper. If other categories are chosen as base categories, e.g. saver type 1, and the model allows 
for correlation between the error terms of other saver types, I find similar results. 
 
< Include table A.4 here > 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the random sample of 2184 households. 
Characteristic (%)
18-34 21.4
35-49 29.7
50-64 23.7
65+ 25.2
Currently married 59.7
Previously married 20.9
Not married 19.4
Haupt-/Volksschule or below 40.9
Mittlere Reife, Fachhochschulreife 37.8
Allgemeine/fachgebundene Hochschulreife 21.3
Employment Status
Retired 35.2
Blue collar 16.0
White collar 22.6
Civil servant 4.2
Self-employed 6.0
Unemployed 7.0
Education/Apprenticeship/Military service/Parental leave 9.0
0 24.5
1 22.0
2 32.2
3 13.4
4+ 7.9
Number of children
Age
Marital Status
Education
 
 37
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the question about households’ saving motives. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
All 22% 19% 59% 14% 24% 62%
<35 20% 21% 59% 15% 25% 60%
35-49 14% 20% 66% 11% 27% 62%
50-64 20% 13% 67% 14% 22% 64%
≥65 35% 20% 45% 18% 21% 61%
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
All 49% 31% 20% 54% 10% 36%
<35 54% 26% 20% 34% 18% 48%
35-49 43% 38% 19% 48% 11% 41%
50-64 53% 30% 17% 61% 8% 31%
≥65 50% 28% 22% 71% 5% 24%
A
ge
Old-age provision motive Precautionary motive
A
ge
Bequest motive Housing motive
 
Note: (1) Unimportant, (2) Important, (3) Very important. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on household saver types. 
 
All 35% 20% 21% 24%
<35 34% 14% 19% 33%
35-49 47% 16% 16% 21%
50-64 40% 18% 21% 21%
≥65 20% 32% 27% 21%
Mean saving rate 18.9% 15.2% 10.3% 1.7%
Std. err. 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.3%
Mean financial wealth [€] 40,147 25,050 16,749 9,895
Std. err. [€] 3,917 2,209 2,340 3,604
Mean total wealth [€] 201,074 187,800 114,104 75,635
Std. err. [€] 20,654 18,648 11,063 11,133
A
ge
Household Saver Type
1 2 3 4
Regular, planned Regular Irregular No saving
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Table 4: CLAD estimation of three different specifications of the saving regressions. 
savings rate Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age 0.263 *** 0.099 0.198 *** 0.076 0.255 *** 0.097
age2 -0.048 ** 0.019 -0.037 ** 0.014 -0.047 ** 0.018
age3 0.003 ** 0.001 0.002 ** 0.001 0.003 ** 0.001
partner 0.027 ** 0.013 0.019 * 0.011 0.024 * 0.013
hhsize -0.010 * 0.005 -0.010 ** 0.005 -0.009 * 0.005
children 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.004
female -0.015 * 0.009 -0.013 0.008 -0.012 0.009
highschool 0.030 ** 0.012 0.019 * 0.011 0.027 ** 0.014
civilservant 0.032 * 0.019 0.034 ** 0.017 0.035 * 0.018
selfemployed 0.042  0.025 0.021 0.025 0.038 0.026
unemployed -0.079 ** 0.033 -0.063 *** 0.020 -0.077 *** 0.030
homeowner 0.080 *** 0.010 0.068 *** 0.009 0.070 *** 0.012
retired 0.009 0.020 0.010 0.017 0.005 0.018
unemp_prob -0.020 0.020 -0.014 0.021 -0.019 0.022
heritage_prob 0.019 0.027 0.012 0.028 0.014 0.027
earnings_var 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.006 *** 0.002 0.005 ** 0.002 0.006 *** 0.002
lifeexpect -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.004
dev_health_sit 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
riskpref 0.005 ** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 ** 0.002
netinc -0.065 0.089 -0.111 0.051 -0.070 0.095
netinc2 0.005 0.064 0.009 0.036 0.006 0.086
financialwealth 0.125 *** 0.040
financialwealth2 -0.008 0.015
wealth 0.004 0.003
wealth2 0.000 0.000
mot_oldage1 0.033 * 0.019 0.025  0.017 0.034 * 0.018
mot_oldage2 0.027 ** 0.011 0.021 ** 0.010 0.030 *** 0.011
mot_oldage3 0.005  0.010 0.010  0.011 0.006  0.010
mot_oldage4 -0.004  0.010 0.000  0.009 0.000  0.010
mot_precaution1 0.003  0.017 0.010  0.015 0.005  0.016
mot_precaution2 0.010  0.011 0.011  0.010 0.008  0.012
mot_precaution3 0.025 ** 0.011 0.014  0.011 0.026 ** 0.010
mot_precaution4 0.024 * 0.013 0.022 ** 0.010 0.026 ** 0.012
mot_homepurchase1 0.025 * 0.015 0.021 * 0.012 0.022  0.015
mot_homepurchase2 0.004  0.008 0.005  0.007 0.006  0.008
mot_homepurchase3 0.005  0.010 0.005  0.009 0.007  0.010
mot_homepurchase4 -0.011  0.011 -0.013  0.009 -0.014  0.011
mot_bequest1 -0.011  0.017 -0.011  0.014 -0.011  0.017
mot_bequest2 0.002  0.010 0.004  0.009 0.001  0.010
mot_bequest3 0.017  0.011 0.013  0.011 0.016  0.011
mot_bequest4 0.022 ** 0.011 0.017 * 0.010 0.017  0.012
constant -0.476 *** 0.172 -0.347 *** 0.130 -0.465 *** 0.168
# obs. 2184 2184 2184
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.091 0.071
(a) (b) (c)
 
Note: *** : 1% significance level; ** : 5% significance level; * : 10% significance level. 
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Table 5: Multinomial logit estimation for three different specifications. Base category: 
 Irregular savers. 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age -1.424 2.920 -1.551 2.906 -1.444 2.922
age2 0.357 0.752 0.383 0.748 0.364 0.753
age3 -0.028 0.062 -0.031 0.061 -0.029 0.062
partner -0.070 0.266 -0.086 0.266 -0.070 0.266
hhsize -0.087 0.116 -0.082 0.115 -0.092 0.116
children -0.029 0.114 -0.022 0.115 -0.021 0.115
female -0.205 0.208 -0.194 0.208 -0.205 0.208
highschool 0.039 0.245 0.019 0.247 0.038 0.246
civilservant 0.931 * 0.480 0.909 * 0.483 0.929 * 0.480
selfemployed 0.397 0.377 0.396 0.378 0.372 0.381
unemployed -0.732 ** 0.341 -0.709 ** 0.342 -0.721 ** 0.342
homeowner 0.274 0.220 0.199 0.224 0.215 0.244
unemp_prob -0.121 0.376 -0.100 0.379 -0.114 0.377
heritage_prob -0.916 0.575 -0.956 * 0.580 -0.921 0.576
earnings_var -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.003 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.004 0.045
lifeexpect 0.024 0.084 0.018 0.084 0.022 0.084
dev_health_sit 0.032 0.055 0.029 0.055 0.033 0.055
riskpref -0.013 0.043 -0.019 0.043 -0.014 0.043
netinc 1.354 ** 0.585 1.074 * 0.591 1.277 ** 0.595
netinc2 -0.110 0.068 -0.091 0.078 -0.105 0.069
financialwealth 0.857 * 0.487
financialwealth2 -0.077 0.085
wealth 0.030 0.055
wealth2 0.000 0.001
mot_oldage 0.248 * 0.143 0.238 * 0.144 0.250 * 0.143
mot_precaution -0.129 0.164 -0.138 0.165 -0.131 0.165
mot_homepurchase 0.182 0.116 0.167 0.117 0.182 0.116
mot_bequest -0.081 0.141 -0.088 0.141 -0.082 0.141
constant 1.074 3.589 1.379 3.578 1.113 3.592
Regular, planned, contractual
age 1.538 2.535 1.402 2.538 1.490 2.538
age2 -0.223 0.649 -0.200 0.650 -0.209 0.650
age3 0.003 0.053 0.001 0.053 0.002 0.053
partner -0.103 0.226 -0.143 0.226 -0.104 0.226
hhsize -0.030 0.100 -0.033 0.100 -0.037 0.100
children -0.103 0.100 -0.083 0.101 -0.092 0.101
female -0.157 0.173 -0.138 0.174 -0.161 0.173
highschool 0.155 0.207 0.077 0.210 0.151 0.208
civilservant 0.878 ** 0.441 0.841 * 0.446 0.877 ** 0.441
selfemployed -0.026 0.340 -0.081 0.346 -0.061 0.343
unemployed -0.532 ** 0.258 -0.470 * 0.258 -0.516 ** 0.258
homeowner 0.498 *** 0.183 0.373 ** 0.186 0.420 ** 0.204
unemp_prob -0.151 0.315 -0.104 0.320 -0.139 0.316
heritage_prob 0.060 0.431 -0.057 0.440 0.059 0.431
earnings_var -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.089 ** 0.038 0.088 ** 0.038 0.091 ** 0.038
lifeexpect 0.033 0.068 0.015 0.069 0.030 0.068
dev_health_sit -0.016 0.045 -0.020 0.045 -0.015 0.045
riskpref -0.002 0.036 -0.013 0.036 -0.004 0.036
netinc 0.777 0.544 0.206 0.539 0.676 0.551
netinc2 -0.046 0.056 0.004 0.058 -0.037 0.057
financialwealth 1.400 *** 0.408
financialwealth2 -0.089 *** 0.029
wealth 0.039 0.048
wealth2 0.000 0.001
mot_oldage 0.790 *** 0.127 0.749 *** 0.127 0.789 *** 0.127
mot_precaution -0.294 ** 0.140 -0.300 ** 0.141 -0.292 ** 0.140
mot_homepurchase -0.122 0.097 -0.129 0.098 -0.119 0.097
mot_bequest 0.172 0.115 0.165 0.116 0.168 0.115
constant -2.829 3.157 -2.331 3.161 -2.750 3.161
# obs. 1066 1066 1066
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.077 0.068
Regular
(a) (b) (c)
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Table A.1: Distribution of wealth and income of German households in SAVE 2003. 
 
Mean Std. err. Median
All 25,125 1,771 7,986
<35 9,252 922 1,200
35-49 31,778 4,417 10,500
50-64 32,852 2,551 14,100
≥65 23,490 3,920 9,000
Mean Std. err. Median
All 150,833 9,005 25,486
<35 48,215 6,346 2,000
35-49 168,627 23,103 40,000
50-64 206,210 17,545 74,681
≥65 164,889 14,582 37,250
Mean Std. err. Median
All 2,476 92 1,866
<35 2,215 194 1,500
35-49 2,945 158 2,315
50-64 2,832 273 1,990
≥65 1,810 71 1,500
Total wealth in 2002 [€]
Net income in 2002 [€/month]
A
ge
A
ge
Financial wealth in 2002 [€]
A
ge
 
 
Note: The difference in standard errors is often due to a few extremely large values, for instance 
the standard error of household net income in age class 50-64. 
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Table A.2: Description of covariates included in the estimated models. 
 
Variable Description 
  
age, age2, age3 age is the age (in years) of the household head divided by 10, i.e.: age = 
(age of household head)/10. age2 is squared age, and age3 is cubic age.  
partner Dummy: 1 if the household is married and/or lives permanently with a 
partner in his/her household. 
hhsize Total number of people living in the household. 
children Total number of children and children-in-law of the household.  
female Dummy: 1 if household head is female. 
highschool Dummy: 1 if the household head and/or his/her partner have a general 
senior high school leaving certificate or a comparable certificate for 
University of Applied Sciences (“(Fach-)Abitur”). 
civilservant Dummy: 1 if the household head is a civil servant (see also footnote 15). 
selfemployed Dummy: 1 if the household head is running a business or any other self-
employed activity. 
unemployed Dummy: 1 if the household head is currently unemployed. 
homeowner Dummy: 1 if a household member owns the currently occupied 
house/apartment. 
retired  Dummy: 1 if the household head is retired. 
unemp_prob Subjective probability of becoming unemployed in the year of the survey. If 
living with partner and both partners are working: Subjective probability 
that at least one of the partners becomes unemployed. 
heritage_prob Subjective probability of inheriting a substantial amount or receiving a gift 
in the future. The probability is included only for those respondents who 
answer in the follow-up question that the inheritance or the gift or will 
improve the financial situation significantly. 
earnings_var Subjective earnings variance. The measure of subjective earnings variance is 
calculated from the subjective unemployment probability of both partners, 
from net income, and from the replacement rate, as in Lusardi (1998). 
dev_ger_econ_sit Expectation about future development of German economic situation, 0 for 
very negative expectation, 10 for very positive expectation. 
lifeexpect Subjective life expectancy of the household head, 7 brackets: < 65, 65-70, 
71-75, 76-80, 81-85, 86-90, > 90  
dev_health_sit Expectation about future development of health situation, 0 for very 
negative expectation, 10 for very positive expectation about future health 
situation. 
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riskpref Risk attitude: Willingness to take risks with respect to money matters. 0: no 
willingness to take risks, 10: high willingness to take risks.  
netinc  Net income of the household, divided by 10,000 €. 
netinc2 netinc · netinc 
wealth  Total net wealth of the household (i.e., savings investments, savings bonds, 
share- and real-estate bonds, occupational and private pension schemes, real 
estate, business wealth etc.), divided by 100,000 €. 
wealth2 wealth · wealth. 
financialwealth Financial wealth of the household (i.e., savings investments, savings bonds, 
share- and real-estate bonds, occupational and private pension schemes etc.), 
divided by 100,000 €. 
financialwealth2 financialwealth · financialwealth. 
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Table A.3: Linear regression of future expectations on age and further household    
                   characteristics. 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age -0.391 *** 0.046 0.054 0.049 -1.948 1.385
partner 0.342 *** 0.114 -0.002 0.122 -8.452 ** 3.461
hhsize -0.024 0.053 0.069 0.056 -1.555 1.595
kids_no -0.172 *** 0.040 -0.028 0.043 -0.437 1.211
female -0.259 *** 0.091 -0.066 0.097 -6.709 ** 2.758
highschool 0.328 *** 0.122 0.503 *** 0.130 -6.709 * 3.677
civilservant 0.226 0.251 0.252 0.267 -18.702 ** 7.580
selfemployed 0.464 ** 0.223 0.032 0.238 -8.067 6.771
unemployed -0.568 *** 0.153 -0.662 *** 0.165 2.346 4.657
homeowner 0.302 *** 0.105 -0.010 0.112 -0.868 3.181
retired -0.651 *** 0.163 -0.310 * 0.173 8.094 * 4.883
riskattitude 0.008 0.020 0.104 *** 0.021 -0.154 0.601
netinc 0.284 0.206 0.525 ** 0.220 152.712 *** 6.791
netinc2 -0.028 0.025 -0.036 0.027 -10.096 *** 0.808
wealth -0.007 0.020 -0.022 0.021 -3.567 *** 0.603
wealth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 *** 0.007
constant 8.804 *** 0.245 2.491 *** 0.260 -2.971 7.373
# obs. 2184 2184 2184
R2 0.227 0.046 0.286
earnings_vardev_health_sit dev_ger_econ_sit
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Table A.4: Multinomial probit estimation for three different specifications. Base category: 
                   Irregular savers. 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age -0.497  2.495 -1.540  2.483 -0.526  3.015
age2 0.152  0.507 0.347  0.562 0.158  0.619
age3 -0.014  0.038 -0.025  0.043 -0.015  0.035
partner -0.052  0.190 -0.051  0.201 -0.050  0.191
hhsize -0.057  0.087 -0.063  0.087 -0.061  0.086
children -0.030  0.096 0.001  0.087 -0.024  0.097
female -0.145  0.145 -0.143  0.153 -0.148  0.144
highschool 0.042  0.200 -0.019  0.185 0.037  0.200
civilservant 0.666 * 0.347 0.576 * 0.327 0.660 * 0.353
selfemployed 0.217  0.323 0.363  0.277 0.196  0.335
unemployed -0.533 ** 0.237 -0.480 * 0.256 -0.523 ** 0.240
homeowner 0.235  0.231 0.068  0.169 0.190  0.231
unemp_prob -0.088  0.286 -0.033  0.288 -0.079  0.284
heritage_prob -0.472  0.594 -0.814 * 0.441 -0.484  0.593
earnings_var -0.002  0.002 -0.003  0.003 -0.002  0.002
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.015  0.048 -0.020  0.034 0.015  0.049
lifeexpect 0.023  0.058 0.015  0.061 0.022  0.057
dev_health_sit 0.015  0.043 0.027  0.041 0.016  0.041
riskpref -0.005  0.030 -0.010  0.032 -0.006  0.030
netinc 0.795 * 0.411 0.861 ** 0.429 0.731 * 0.430
netinc2 -0.062  0.049 -0.081  0.070 -0.057  0.051
financialwealth 0.508  0.367
financialwealth2 -0.144  0.095
wealth 0.020 0.037
wealth2 0.000 0.001
mot_oldage 0.285  0.318 0.043  0.112 0.277  0.323
mot_precaution -0.121  0.160 -0.047  0.126 -0.119  0.159
mot_homepurchase 0.079  0.144 0.167 * 0.088 0.084  0.143
mot_bequest -0.015  0.147 -0.109  0.105 -0.021  0.146
constant 0.245  2.643 1.310  3.092 0.288  2.734
Regular, planned, contractual
age 1.019  2.763 1.738  2.057 1.040  2.679
age2 -0.140  0.498 -0.302  0.502 -0.143  0.467
age3 0.001  0.036 0.011  0.040 0.001  0.033
partner -0.071  0.176 -0.096  0.176 -0.071  0.177
hhsize -0.028 0.083 -0.021  0.078 -0.032  0.083
children -0.075  0.081 -0.076  0.079 -0.068  0.082
female -0.115 0.139 -0.090  0.133 -0.120  0.138
highschool 0.112 0.160 0.052  0.160 0.108  0.160
civilservant 0.647 * 0.345 0.543 * 0.298 0.641 * 0.350
selfemployed -0.021  0.303 -0.193  0.255 -0.059  0.308
unemployed -0.461 ** 0.232 -0.353 * 0.210 -0.445 * 0.234
homeowner 0.367 *** 0.143 0.306 ** 0.142 0.312 ** 0.157
unemp_prob -0.115  0.251 -0.073  0.251 -0.105  0.248
heritage_prob 0.023  0.445 0.133  0.338 0.029  0.452
earnings_var -0.001  0.001 0.000  0.001 -0.001  0.001
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.063 * 0.033 0.077 *** 0.029 0.065 ** 0.033
lifeexpect 0.027  0.053 0.019  0.052 0.026  0.052
dev_health_sit -0.008 0.039 -0.022  0.036 -0.008  0.038
riskpref -0.001 0.028 -0.006  0.027 -0.002  0.028
netinc 0.495  0.476 -0.117  0.360 0.401  0.492
netinc2 -0.027  0.047 0.027  0.040 -0.019  0.048
financialwealth 0.862 *** 0.233
financialwealth2 -0.055 *** 0.018
wealth 0.027 0.034
wealth2 0.000 0.001
mot_oldage 0.588 *** 0.121 0.623 *** 0.102 0.590 *** 0.118
mot_precaution -0.216 * 0.114 -0.241 ** 0.110 -0.216 * 0.111
mot_homepurchase -0.080 0.104 -0.138 * 0.075 -0.079  0.105
mot_bequest 0.118 0.103 0.160 * 0.089 0.116  0.103
constant -1.787 4.731 -2.865  2.598 -1.807 4.919
# obs. 1066 1066 1066
Log Likelihood -996.902 -987.599 -996.342
Regular
(a) (b) (c)
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Figure 1: Mean and median saving rates for different age classes, SAVE 2003. 
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Note: Data points are connected to facilitate readability 
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Figure 2: Coefficients of the CLAD estimation for four saving motives and age classes. The 
coefficients of the CLAD estimation denote the change in the saving rate in 
percentage points due to a change in the subjective rating of a certain saving motive 
by one unit.  
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Figure A.1: Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures at Old Age22 
 
 
                                                 
22 The author is grateful to Mathias Sommer for his work on medical expenditures with the EVS-data. 
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